Human dignity, autonomy and legal capacity in the law of persons: A comparative analysis of the peruvian and ecuadorian models

Abstract

The development of the Law of Persons has fostered a shift from a pat-rimonial conception of Civil Law toward a model centered on the hu-man person as the supreme purpose of the legal system. In this context, human dignity, personal autonomy, and legal capacity have become fundamental principles for the protection of rights, especially for those who have historically been excluded or whose will has been substituted. This article comparatively analyzes the legal regulation and jurispruden-tial development of these principles in the Peruvian and Ecuadorian legal systems. The study adopts a legal-dogmatic approach and applies the comparative method through the analysis of constitutional and civil rules, international instruments, and landmark judicial decisions. The findings reveal a progressive constitutionalization of Civil Law in both countries, driven by constitutional case law and international human rights standards. It is concluded that Peru and Ecuador have evolved toward a personalist model that recognizes individual autonomy as an essential manifestation of human dignity, although regulatory challenges persist regarding legal capacity, family diversity, personal identity, and the effective exercise of fundamental rights.